Abstract
We introduce and define the notion of identity-based zero-knowledge, concentrating on the non-interactive setting. In this setting, our notion allows any prover to widely disseminate a proof of a statement while protecting the prover from plagiarism in the following sense: although proofs are transferable (i.e., publicly verifiable), they are also bound to the identity of the prover in a way which is recognizable to any verifier. Furthermore, an adversary is unable to change this identity (i.e., to claim the proof as his own, or to otherwise change the authorship), unless he could have proved the statement on his own.
While we view the primary contribution of this work as a formal definition of the above notion, we also explore the relation of this notion to that of non-malleable (non-interactive) zero-knowledge. On the one hand, we show that these two notions are incomparable: that is, there are proof systems which are non-malleable but not identity-based, and vice versa. On the other hand, we show that a proof system of either type essentially implies a proof system of the other type.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Barak, B.: Constant-Round Coin-Tossing with a Man in the Middle or Realizing the Shared Random String Model. In: FOCS (2002)
Blum, M.: How to Prove a Theorem so No One Else Can Claim It. In: Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (1986)
Blum, M., Feldman, P., Micali, S.: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge and Its Applications. In: STOC (1988)
Canetti, R.: Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols. In: FOCS (2001)
Cramer, R., Damgård, I.: Fast and Secure Immunization Against Adaptive Man-in-the-Middle Impersonation. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 75–87. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
De Santis, A., Di Crescenzo, G., Ostrovsky, R., Persiano, G., Sahai, A.: Robust Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, p. 566. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Non-Malleable Cryptography. SIAM J. Computing 30(2), 391–437 (2000)
Feige, U., Lapidot, D., Shamir, A.: Multiple Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs Under General Assumptions. SIAM J. Comp. 29(1), 1–28 (1999)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems. SIAM J. Comp. 18(1), 186–208 (1989)
Jakobsson, M., Sako, K., Impagliazzo, R.: Designated-Verifier Proofs and their Applications. In: Maurer, U.M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 143–154. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Smith, A.: Round Efficiency of Multi-Party Computation with a Dishonest Majority. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Naor, M.: Bit Commitment Using Pseudorandomness. J. Crypto. 4(2), 151–158 (1991)
Ostrovsky, R., Wigderson, A.: One-Way Functions are Essential for Non-Trivial Zero-Knowledge. In: 2nd Israeli Symp. on Theory of Computing and Systems (1993)
Pass, R.: On Deniability in the Common Reference String and Random Oracle Models. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 316–337. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Pass, R.: Bounded-Concurrent Multi-Party Computation with a Dishonest Majority. In: STOC (2004)
Sahai, A.: Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Security. In: FOCS (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Rabin, M.O. (2005). Identity-Based Zero-Knowledge. In: Blundo, C., Cimato, S. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3352. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30598-9_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24301-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30598-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)