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Side Channel Cryptanalysis on SEED

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3325))

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Abstract

The Korea standard block cipher, SEED, is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher with a more complex F function than DES. This paper shows that SEED is vulnerable to two types of side channel attacks, a fault analysis attack and a power analysis attack. The first one is a fault insertion analysis which induces permanent faults on the whole left register of 15-round. This attack allows one to obtain the secret key by using only two faulty cipher texts for encryption and decryption processing respectively. The second attack is a more realistic differential power analysis. This attack requires about 1000 power traces to find the full secret key. The above two attacks use a reverse property of the F function to obtain secret key, where the reverse property is derived from the our research.

This research has been supported by University IT Research Center Project.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National Univ., Daegu, 702-701, Korea

    HyungSo Yoo, ChangKyun Kim & SangJae Moon

  2. Division of Information Science, Korea Nazarene Univ., Cheonan, Choongnam, 330-718, Korea

    JaeCheol Ha

  3. National Security Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea

    IlHwan Park

Authors
  1. HyungSo Yoo
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  2. ChangKyun Kim
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  3. JaeCheol Ha
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  4. SangJae Moon
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  5. IlHwan Park
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Engineering, Sejong University, 143-747, Seoul, Korea

    Chae Hoon Lim

  2. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

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Yoo, H., Kim, C., Ha, J., Moon, S., Park, I. (2005). Side Channel Cryptanalysis on SEED. In: Lim, C.H., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3325. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31815-6_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31815-6_33

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24015-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31815-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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