Abstract
Information leakage via electromagnetic emanation, usually known as Tempest, has been recognized as a threat and countermeasures have been proposed. In particular, Kuhn and Anderson developed a protective measure for Tempest called the Tempest fonts. Through experiments, we have investigated and evaluated the effectiveness of the Tempest fonts. Furthermore, we propose a new measure based on a similar approach to prevent successful Tempest attacks. While Kuhn and Anderson use Fourier transformation as a low-pass filter, our approach uses a Gaussian filter in addition to Fourier transformation. Our experimental results show that this approach is more effective.
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Tanaka, H., Takizawa, O., Yamamura, A. (2005). Evaluation and Improvement of the Tempest Fonts. In: Lim, C.H., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3325. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31815-6_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31815-6_36
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