Abstract
E-polling systems are a fundamental component of any e-democracy system as they represent the most appropriate tool for fostering citizens participation to public debates. Contrarily to e-voting protocols, they are characterized by less stringent security requirements in particular they can tolerate errors affecting a small percentage of votes, without the compromision of the final result. Thus the construction of accurate and privacy respectful e-polling protocols is an objective which should be pursued by the research community as it is more close than the construction of practical e-voting protocols. However so far all the research efforts have been spent on the construction of e-voting protocols and the existing e-polling protocols are not respectful of the most elementary security and privacy rules. In this paper we propose a simple protocol for an accurate and anonymous e-polling system. More precisely our protocol satisfies the following properties: a vote cannot be altered, duplicated, or removed without being detected, votes remain anonymous. Moreover voters will be able to measure the level of trust of the process and its accuracy by verifying that their own votes have been counted correctly.
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Bruschi, D., Fovino, I.N., Lanzi, A. (2005). A Protocol for Anonymous and Accurate E-Polling. In: Böhlen, M., Gamper, J., Polasek, W., Wimmer, M.A. (eds) E-Government: Towards Electronic Democracy. TCGOV 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3416. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32257-3_11
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