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Preventing Bluff Agent Invasions in Honest Societies

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Advances in Artificial Life (ECAL 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2801))

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Abstract

Frequently debated issues in the domain of game theory involve the issue of signalling strategies used in order to resolve conflicts between agents over indivisible resources and to reduce the costly outcomes associated with fighting. Signalling behaviour, used by agents of different strengths, to aid resource acquisition was modelled using an artificial life simulation environment. Honest signalling and the bluff strategy based on Enquist/Hurd’s adapted pay-off matrix (1997) were evaluated relative to different proportions of resident strong agents capable of imposing a ‘punishment’ cost on bluffer agents. We found that in order for honest signalling to be immune to invasion by a bluff strategy, the number of punishment enforcers in the society must be high. Additionally, the number of punishment enforcers is more influential in preventing bluff agent invasions than the severity of punishment.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Adaptive Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences, University of Hertfordshire, College Lane, Hatfield Herts, AL10 9AB, United Kingdom

    Robert Lowe & Daniel Polani

Authors
  1. Robert Lowe
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  2. Daniel Polani
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada

    Wolfgang Banzhaf

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Dortmund, 11, Joseph-von-Fraunhofer-Str. 20, 44227, Dortmund, Germany

    Jens Ziegler

  3. Fraunhofer IAIS, Sankt Augustin

    Thomas Christaller

  4. Bio Systems Analysis Group, Jena Centre for Bioinformatics and Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 1–4, D-07743, Jena, Germany

    Peter Dittrich

  5. School of Computing Sciences, University of East Anglia, NR4 7TJ, Norwich, United Kingdom

    Jan T. Kim

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lowe, R., Polani, D. (2003). Preventing Bluff Agent Invasions in Honest Societies. In: Banzhaf, W., Ziegler, J., Christaller, T., Dittrich, P., Kim, J.T. (eds) Advances in Artificial Life. ECAL 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2801. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39432-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39432-7_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20057-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-39432-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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