Abstract
In the areas of computer security and cryptography a standard model for adversaries is the Dolev-Yao threat model. In the areas of formal analysis of complex, concurrent, communication and reactive systems, one of the foundations for formal analysis methodologies is a structured operational semantics (SOS) for Milner’s process algebra Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). In this paper we provide a CCS-SOS modelling of the Dolev-Yao threat model. The intuitively appealing modelling indicates a suitability for the well studied formal analysis methodologies based on CCS-SOS being applied to computer security and cryptography.
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Mao, W. (2004). A Structured Operational Modelling of the Dolev-Yao Threat Model. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2845. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39871-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39871-4_5
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