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More Detail for a Combined Timing and Power Attack against Implementations of RSA

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Cryptography and Coding (Cryptography and Coding 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2898))

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Abstract

Implementations of Montgomery’s modular multiplication algorithm (MMM) typically make conditional subtractions in order to keep the output within register or modulus bounds. For some standard exponentiation algorithms such as m-ary, it has been shown that this yields enough information to deduce the value of the exponent. This has serious implications for revealing the secret key in cryptographic applications without adequate counter-measures. Much more detail is provided here about the distribution of output values from MMM when the output is only reduced to keep it within register bounds, about how implementations of sliding windows can be attacked, and about handling errors.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Godesberger Allee 185-189, 53175, Bonn, Germany

    Werner Schindler

  2. Comodo Research Laboratory, 10 Hey Street, Bradford, BD7 1DQ, UK

    Colin D. Walter

Authors
  1. Werner Schindler
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  2. Colin D. Walter
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, TW20 0EX, Egham, Surrey, U.K.

    Kenneth G. Paterson

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Schindler, W., Walter, C.D. (2003). More Detail for a Combined Timing and Power Attack against Implementations of RSA. In: Paterson, K.G. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. Cryptography and Coding 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2898. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40974-8_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40974-8_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20663-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40974-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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