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TAPS: The Last Few Slides

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Formal Aspects of Security (FASec 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2629))

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Abstract

In the last few years, a variety of methods have been used to verify cryptographic protocols in unbounded Dolev-Yao models. However, these methods typically rely on rather drastic assumptions (e.g., the injectivity of tupling and encryption), and it is unclear how to extend these methods to more realistic protocol models. We show how the first-order verification method of [1] (implemented in the verifier TAPS) can be extended to more faithfully capture some features of real protocols, including weak secrets, bitwise concatenation and projection, reversible encryption, and bitwise exclusive-or. (These extensions are usually relegated to the last few slides in presentations of TAPS, hence the title.)

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References

  1. Cohen, E.: First-order verification of cryptographic protocols. JCS (to appear); A preliminary version appears in CSFW XIII (2000)

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  2. Cohen, E.: Proving protocols safe from guessing attacks. IJIS (to appear); Also in FCS/VERIFY workshop (2002)

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  3. Heather, J., Lowe, G., Schneider, S.: How to prevent type flaw attacks on cryptographic protocols. CSFW XIII (2000)

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  4. Lowe, G.: Analysing protocols subject to guessing attacks. WITS (2002)

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  5. Paulson, L.: Verifying the SET protocol: overview. In: Abdallah, A.E., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S. (eds.) FASec 2002. LNCS, vol. 2629, pp. 4–14. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cohen, E. (2003). TAPS: The Last Few Slides. In: Abdallah, A.E., Ryan, P., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security. FASec 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2629. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20693-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40981-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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