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Automated Protocol Analysis in Maude

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2699))

Abstract

We present an approach to automated protocol analysis using the Maude rewrite system. We describe the process of translating high-level protocol specifications from the Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language (CAPSL) into an executable Maude specification. After this translation step, we dynamically extend the specification by adding an intruder agent. Based on this representation of a protocol environment, different model checkers can be applied to evaluate whether all protocol properties hold in the presence of the intruder.

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References

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Van Baalen, J., Böhne, T. (2003). Automated Protocol Analysis in Maude. In: Hinchey, M.G., Rash, J.L., Truszkowski, W.F., Rouff, C., Gordon-Spears, D. (eds) Formal Approaches to Agent-Based Systems. FAABS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2699. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45133-4_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45133-4_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40665-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45133-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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