Abstract
Pseudonym systems allow users to interact with multiple organizations anonymously by using pseudonyms. Such schemes are of significant practical relevance because it is the best means of providing privacy for users. In previous works, users transact with a organization by demonstration of possession of a credential issued by the organization or relationship with another credential. However, the information that a user has a credential from a specific organization compromises privacy of the user. In the present paper, we give a formal definition of practical pseudonym system in which the level of privacy provided can be chosen be according to security policies.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Chaum, D.: Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM 28, 1030–1044 (1985)
Chaum, D., Evertse, J.-H.: A secure and privacy - protecting protocol for transmitting personal information between organizations. In: Proceedings of CRYPTO 1986, vol. 263, pp. 118–167. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Chen, L.: Access with pseudonyms. In: Dawson, E.P., Golić, J.D. (eds.) Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms 1995. LNCS, vol. 1029, pp. 232–243. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Damgard, I.B.: Payment systems and credential mechanism with provable security against abuse by individuals. In: Goldwasser, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1988. LNCS, vol. 403, pp. 328–335. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Lysyanskaya, A., et al.: Pseudonym Systems. In: Heys, H.M., Adams, C.M. (eds.) SAC 1999. LNCS, vol. 1758, p. 184. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: Efficient non-transferable anonymous multishow credential system with optional anonymity revocation. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 93–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: Dynamic accumulators and application to efficient revocation of anonymous credentials. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 61–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Camenisch, J., Herreweghen, E.V.: Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system. In: ACM CCS 2002 (2002)
Ateniese, G., et al.: A practical and provably secure coalition-resistant group signature scheme. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 255–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient signature generation for smart cards. Journal of Cryptology 4, 239–252 (1991)
Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solution to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T.: Statistical zero knowledge protocols to prove modular polynomial relations. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 16–30. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Camenisch, J., Stadler, M.: Efficient group signature schemes for large groups. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 410–424. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption. In: Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 46–52. ACM Press, New York (1999)
Bellare, M., et al.: The Power of RSA Inversion Oracles and the Security of Chaum’s RSA-Based Blind Signature Scheme. In: Syverson, P.F. (ed.) FC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2339, pp. 319–338. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Tamura, Y., Miyaji, A. (2003). Anonymity-Enhanced Pseudonym System. In: Zhou, J., Yung, M., Han, Y. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2846. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45203-4_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45203-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20208-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45203-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive