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Information Flow Security and Recursive Systems

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2841))

Abstract

Information flow security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no high level information is revealed to low level users, even in the presence of any possible malicious process. Persistent_BNDC (P_BNDC, for short) is an information-flow security property which is suitable to deal with processes in dynamic contexts. In this work we show that P_BNDC is compositional with respect to the replication operator. Then, by exploiting the compositionality properties of the class of P_BNDC processes, we define a proof system which provides a very efficient technique for the stepwise development and the verification of recursively defined P_BNDC processes.

This work has been partially supported by the MURST project “Modelli formali per la sicurezza” and the EU Contract IST-2001-32617 “Models and Types for Security in Mobile Distributed Systems” (MyThS).

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Bossi, A., Macedonio, D., Piazza, C., Rossi, S. (2003). Information Flow Security and Recursive Systems. In: Blundo, C., Laneve, C. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. ICTCS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45208-9_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45208-9_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20216-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45208-9

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