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Comparing the Pre- and Post-specified Peer Models for Key Agreement

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5107))

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Abstract

In the pre-specified peer model for key agreement, it is assumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended communicating peer when it commences a protocol run. On the other hand, a party in the post-specified peer model for key agreement does not know the identifier of its communicating peer at the outset, but learns the identifier during the protocol run. In this paper we compare the security assurances provided by the Canetti-Krawczyk security definitions for key agreement in the pre- and post-specified peer models. We give examples of protocols that are secure in one model but insecure in the other. We also enhance the Canetti-Krawczyk security models and definitions to encompass a class of protocols that are executable and secure in both the pre- and post-specified peer models.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Combinatorics & Optimization, University of Waterloo,  

    Alfred Menezes & Berkant Ustaoglu

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  1. Alfred Menezes
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  2. Berkant Ustaoglu
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Yi Mu Willy Susilo Jennifer Seberry

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Menezes, A., Ustaoglu, B. (2008). Comparing the Pre- and Post-specified Peer Models for Key Agreement. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69971-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70500-0

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