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Internet Ad Auctions: Insights and Directions

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5125))

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Abstract

On the Internet, there are advertisements (ads) of different kinds: image, text, video and other specially marked objects that are distinct from the underlying content of the page. There is an industry behind the management of such ads, and they face a number of algorithmic challenges. This note will present a small selection of such problems, some insights and open research directions.

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Muthukrishnan, S. (2008). Internet Ad Auctions: Insights and Directions. In: Aceto, L., Damgård, I., Goldberg, L.A., Halldórsson, M.M., Ingólfsdóttir, A., Walukiewicz, I. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5125. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70575-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70574-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70575-8

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