Abstract
In this paper, we constructed three types of agents, which are different in efficiency and accuracy of learning. They were compared using acquired payoff in a game-theoretic situation that is called Minority game. As a result, different types of learning methods got the highest payoff according to the complexity of environmental change and learning speed.
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Izumi, K. (2007). Analysis of Efficiency and Accuracy of Learning in Minority Games. In: Sakurai, A., Hasida, K., Nitta, K. (eds) New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI JSAI 2003 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3609. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71009-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71009-7_9
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Online ISBN: 978-3-540-71009-7
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