Abstract
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying/selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield different outcomes (i.e., different revenues and also different profits to the winning bidders). Hence, both the auctioneer and the bidding agents want to know which mechanism is better for them. Given this, we compare the outcomes for these mechanisms for the following scenario. There are multiple similar objects for sale, each object is sold in a separate auction, and each bidder needs only one object. We use English auction rules and first determine equilibrium bidding strategies for each individual auction for the simultaneous and sequential cases. We do this for both common and private value objects by treating a bidder’s information about these values as uncertain. We then consider the case where the private and common values have a uniform distribution and compare the two mechanisms in terms of three key properties: a bidder’s ex-ante expected profit, the auctioneer’s expected cumulative revenue, and the total expected surplus. For both common and private value objects, our study shows the following result. The expected cumulative revenue and the expected total surplus is higher for the sequential mechanism. However, a bidder’s exante expected profit depends on the number of objects being auctioned and the number of participating bidders, and it is sometimes higher for the sequential mechanism and sometimes for the simultaneous one.
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Fatima, S.S. (2007). A Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous Auctions. In: Fasli, M., Shehory, O. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Automated Negotiation and Strategy Design for Electronic Markets. TADA AMEC 2006 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4452. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72502-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72502-2_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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