Abstract
This paper proposes a novel auction-based mechanisms named Decreasing Cancellation Fee Auction (DCFA) for task allocation in the environment where a service provider has finite capacities and consumers could withdraw their bids. We consider a new type of auction called the refundable auction, i. e. refund means that a consumer’s showing up is uncertain and he can get back partial of his payment if his cancellation or no-show occurs. This mechanism can boost seller revenue, satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality and still hold a high efficiency.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Assuncao, M.D., Buyya, R.: An Evaluation of Communication Demand of Auction Protocols in Grid Environments. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Grid Economics & Business, World Scientific Press, Singapore (2006)
Byde, A.: Incentive-Compatibility, Individual-Rationality and Fairness for Quality of Service Claims, Technique Reports, HPL-2006-27 (February 27, 2006)
Buyya, R., Abramson, D., Giddy, J., Stockinger, H.: Economic Models for Resource Management and Scheduling in Grid Computing. Journal of Concurrency and Computation 14(13-15), 1507–1542 (2002)
Chao, H.P., Wilson, R.: Multi-Dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reservation: Robust Incentvie-Compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules. Journal of Regulatory Economics 22(2), 161–183 (2002)
Che, Y.K.: Design Compition through Multidimensional Auctions. RAND Journal of Economics 24(4), 668–680 (1993)
Cheloitis, G., Kneyon, C., Buyya, R.: 10 Lessons from Finance for Commercial Sharing of It Resources, Peer-to-Peer Computing: The Evolution of a Disruptive Technology, 244–264 (2004)
Clarke, E.H.: Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice 11, 17–33 (1971)
Groves, T.: Incentives in Teams. Econometrica 41, 617–631 (1973)
Harstad, R.M., Rothkopf, M.H.: Withdrawable Bids ss Winner’S Course Insurance. Operations Research 43(6), 334–339 (1998)
Holland, A., Sullivan, B.O.: Truthful Risk-Managed Combinatorial Auctions. In: Proceedings of IJCAI 2007, Hyderabad, India (January 2007)
Huang, Z., Qiu, Y.: Resource Trading using Cognitive Agents: A Hybrid Perspective and Its Simulation. Future Generation Computer Systems 23(7), 837–845 (2007)
Huang, Z., Qiu, Y.: A Comparison of Advance Resource Reservation Bidding Strategies in Sequential Ascending Auctions. In: Zhang, Y., Tanaka, K., Yu, J.X., Wang, S., Li, M. (eds.) APWeb 2005. LNCS, vol. 3399, pp. 742–752. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Huberman, B.A., Wu, F., Zhang, L.: Ensuring Trust in One Time Exchange: Solving the QoS Problem. Netnomics 22(2), 161–183 (2006)
Matsubara, S.: Auction in Dynamic Environments: Incorporating The Cost Caused By Re-Allocation. In: AAMAS-2005. Proceedings of the Fourth Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pp. 643–649 (2005)
Menezes, F.M., Monteiro, P.K.: An Introduction to Auction Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)
Porter, R., Ronen, A., Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty. In: Proceedings of the 18th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 414–421 (2002)
Ringbom, S., Shy, O.: Advance Booking, Cancellations, and Partial Refunds. Economics Bulletin 13(1), 1–7 (2004)
Sandholm, T., Conitzer, V.: Leveled Commitment Contracting: a Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. AI Magazine 23(3), 89–100 (2002)
Sandholm, T., Zhou, Y.: Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. Artificial Intelligence 142, 239–264 (2000)
Shy, O.: How To Price: a Guide to Pricing Techniques and Yield Management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (to appear, 2008)
Smith, W., Forster, I., Taylor, V.: Scheduling with Advanced Reservations. In: Proceedings of the IPDPS Conference, pp. 127–135 (May 2000)
Srivastava, J., Lurie, N.H.: A Consumer Perspective on Price-Matching Refund Policies: Effect on Price Perceptions and Search Behavior. Journal of Consumer Research 28(2), 296–307 (2001)
Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8–37 (1961)
Wu, F., Zhang, L., Huberman, B.: Truth-telling Reservations. In: The 1st Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (2005)
Wurman, P.R., Walsh, W.E., Wellman, M.P.: Flexible Double Auctions for Electornic Commerce: Theory and Implementation. Decision Support Systems 24, 17–27 (1998)
Yokoo, M.: The Characterization of Strategy/False-Name Proof Combinatorial Auction Protocols: Price-Oriented, Rationing-Free Protocol. In: Proceedings of IJCAI 2003, pp. 733–739 (2003)
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust Double Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids. Journal of Desision Support Systems 39, 241–252 (2005)
Zheng, C.Z.: Optimal Auction in A Multidimensional World, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0296 (2000)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Huang, Z., Matsubara, S. (2007). DFCA: A Flexible Refundable Auction for Limited Capacity Suppliers. In: Veit, D.J., Altmann, J. (eds) Grid Economics and Business Models. GECON 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4685. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74430-6_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74430-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74428-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74430-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)