Abstract
To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an issue, or where it is difficult to express the utility of all participants in a monetary domain.
We propose a modified Vickrey auction based only on preferences over the possible bids. This approach also allows for situations where a bid is not just a price or some fixed set of attributes, but can be any possible offer. We prove that in this flexible, generalized setting, the Vickrey mechanism is still incentive compatible and results in a Pareto-efficient solution.
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Máhr, T., de Weerdt, M. (2007). Auctions with Arbitrary Deals. In: Mařík, V., Vyatkin, V., Colombo, A.W. (eds) Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing. HoloMAS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4659. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74481-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74481-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74478-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74481-8
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