Abstract
In this paper we demonstrate how to reduce the overhead and delay of circuit establishment in the Tor anonymizing network by using predistributed Diffie-Hellman values. We eliminate the use of RSA encryption and decryption from circuit setup, and we reduce the number of DH exponentiations vs. the current Tor circuit setup protocol while maintaining immediate forward secrecy. We also describe savings that can be obtained by precomputing during idle cycles values that can be determined before the protocol starts. We introduce the distinction of eventual vs. immediate forward secrecy and present protocols that illustrate the distinction. These protocols are even more efficient in communication and computation than the one we primarily propose, but they provide only eventual forward secrecy. We describe how to reduce the overhead and the complexity of hidden server connections by using our DH-values to implement valet nodes and eliminate the need for rendezvous points as they exist today. We also discuss the security of the new elements and an analysis of efficiency improvements.
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Øverlier, L., Syverson, P. (2007). Improving Efficiency and Simplicity of Tor Circuit Establishment and Hidden Services. In: Borisov, N., Golle, P. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4776. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_9
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