Abstract
Using depth(k) abstract domain, we present an abstraction and refinement framework for verifying security protocols based on logic programming. The solved-form fixpoint of the logic program model is abstracted by depth(k) abstract domain, which guarantees termination of the verification algorithm; If the result of the verification algorithm with the abstract solved-form fixpoint shows there exists counterexamples, but the result of the verification algorithm with the logic rules in abstract solved-form fixpoint which are not abstracted shows there exists no counterexamples, then the abstracted solved-form fixpoint is refined by increasing the value of term depth bound k. With this framework, all of the verification, constructing counterexamples and refinement can be implemented in a mechanized way.
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Li, M., Zhou, T., Li, Z., Chen, H. (2007). An Abstraction and Refinement Framework for Verifying Security Protocols Based on Logic Programming. In: Cervesato, I. (eds) Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. Computer and Network Security. ASIAN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4846. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_16
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