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Multilane HMAC— Security beyond the Birthday Limit

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Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2007 (INDOCRYPT 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4859))

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Abstract

HMAC is a popular MAC (Message Authentication Code) that is based on a cryptographic hash function. HMAC is provided with a formal proof of security, in which it is proven to be a PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) under the condition that its underlying compression function is a PRF. Nonetheless, the security of HMAC is limited by a birthday attack, that is, HMAC using a compression function with n-bit output gets forged after about 2n/2 queries. In this paper we resolve this problem by introducing novel construction we call L-Lane HMAC. Our construction is provided with concrete-security reduction accomplishing a security guarantee well beyond the birthday limit. L-Lane HMAC requires more invocations to the compression function than the conventional HMAC, but the performance decline is smaller than those of previous constructs. In addition, L-Lane HMAC inherits the design principles of the original HMAC, such as single-key usage and off-the-shelf hash-function calls.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-9-11 Midoricho Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585, Japan

    Kan Yasuda

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  1. Kan Yasuda
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K. Srinathan C. Pandu Rangan Moti Yung

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Yasuda, K. (2007). Multilane HMAC— Security beyond the Birthday Limit. In: Srinathan, K., Rangan, C.P., Yung, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2007. INDOCRYPT 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4859. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77025-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77026-8

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