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Attacking the Filter Generator by Finding Zero Inputs of the Filtering Function

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Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2007 (INDOCRYPT 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4859))

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Abstract

The filter generator is an important building block in many stream ciphers. We present here an attack that recovers the initial state of the hidden LFSR by detecting the positions where the inputs of the filtering function are equal to zero. This attack requires the precomputation of low weight multiples of the LFSR generating polynomial. By a careful analysis, we show that the attack complexity is among the best known and work for almost all cryptographic filtering functions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Projet CODES, INRIA Rocquencourt, Domaine de Voluceau, 78153 Le Chesnay cedex,  

    Frédéric Didier

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  1. Frédéric Didier
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K. Srinathan C. Pandu Rangan Moti Yung

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Didier, F. (2007). Attacking the Filter Generator by Finding Zero Inputs of the Filtering Function. In: Srinathan, K., Rangan, C.P., Yung, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2007. INDOCRYPT 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4859. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_32

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77025-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77026-8

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