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Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning

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Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III. Adaptation and Multi-Agent Learning (AAMAS 2005, ALAMAS 2007, ALAMAS 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4865))

Abstract

For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. This paper gives an overview of this work. The paper presents results from several experiments that we have carried out, and tries to place these in the context of the overall task that we are engaged in.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Ashton Building, Ashton Street, Liverpool, L69, 3BX,  

    Steve Phelps, Peter McBurney & Simon Parsons

  2. Department of Computer Science Graduate Center, City University of New York, 365 5th Avenue, New York, NY, 10016, USA

    Kai Cai, Jinzhong Niu, Simon Parsons & Elizabeth Sklar

  3. Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, USA

    Simon Parsons & Elizabeth Sklar

Authors
  1. Steve Phelps
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  2. Kai Cai
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  3. Peter McBurney
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  4. Jinzhong Niu
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  5. Simon Parsons
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  6. Elizabeth Sklar
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Karl Tuyls Ann Nowe Zahia Guessoum Daniel Kudenko

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Phelps, S., Cai, K., McBurney, P., Niu, J., Parsons, S., Sklar, E. (2008). Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning. In: Tuyls, K., Nowe, A., Guessoum, Z., Kudenko, D. (eds) Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III. Adaptation and Multi-Agent Learning. AAMAS ALAMAS ALAMAS 2005 2007 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4865. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77947-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77949-0

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