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Secure Cryptographic Precomputation with Insecure Memory

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4991))

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Abstract

We propose a solution that provides secure storage for cryptographic precomputation using insecure memory that is susceptible to eavesdropping and tampering. Specifically, we design a small tamper-resistant hardware module, the Queue Security Proxy (QSP), that situates transparently on the data-path between the processor and the insecure memory. Our analysis shows that our design is secure and flexible, and yet efficient and inexpensive. In particular, both the timing overhead and the hardware cost of our solution are independent of the storage size.

This work was supported in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2006-CS-001-000001, the Institute for Security Technology Studies, under Grant number 2005-DD-BX-1091 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-0524695. The views and conclusions do not necessarily represent those of the sponsors.

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Liqun Chen Yi Mu Willy Susilo

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Tsang, P.P., Smith, S.W. (2008). Secure Cryptographic Precomputation with Insecure Memory. In: Chen, L., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4991. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79103-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-79104-1

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