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Provably Secure N-Party Authenticated Key Exchange in the Multicast DPWA Setting

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4990))

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Abstract

Until now, it is still an open problem to provide a provably secure and efficient protocol for treating the case in which n communication parties can authenticate each other and establish a secure session key with their respective passwords shared with a trusted server. Accordingly, in this paper we propose a solution in a formal way. Firstly, we review the strengthened EKE-M protocol—a maiden attempt to resolve the setting above and point out a subtle flaw in it that may cause unknown key sharing attacks. Next, based on previous work in the adversary model for key establishment protocols, we provide an extended one for the N-party setting. Finally, we propose a constant-round and provably secure generic construction of N-party different password-authentication (DPWA) key exchange protocols in the multicast setting.

This work was supported by NSFC60573053.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, P.R. China

    Weijia Wang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, (Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences), Beijing, 100049, P.R. China

    Weijia Wang, Lei Hu & Yong Li

  3. School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, P.R. China

    Yong Li

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  1. Weijia Wang
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  2. Lei Hu
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  3. Yong Li
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Dingyi Pei Moti Yung Dongdai Lin Chuankun Wu

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Wang, W., Hu, L., Li, Y. (2008). Provably Secure N-Party Authenticated Key Exchange in the Multicast DPWA Setting. In: Pei, D., Yung, M., Lin, D., Wu, C. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4990. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79499-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79499-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79498-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-79499-8

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