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An Efficient Deniable Key Exchange Protocol (Extended Abstract)

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5143))

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Abstract

A deniable key exchange allows two parties to jointly share a secret key while neither of two nor an outsider can prove to a third party that the communication between the two happened. This is an important mechanism for realizing a deniably secure channel. In this paper, we propose an efficient key exchange protocol and prove its deniable security. We compare our construction with the best known protocol with the same property and show the advantages of the new construction.

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Gene Tsudik

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jiang, S., Safavi-Naini, R. (2008). An Efficient Deniable Key Exchange Protocol (Extended Abstract). In: Tsudik, G. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5143. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85229-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85230-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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