Abstract
We develop a scheme for providing strong cryptographic authentication on a stream of messages which consumes very little bandwidth (as little as one bit per message) and is robust in the presence of dropped messages. Such a scheme should be useful for extremely low-power, low-bandwidth wireless sensor networks and “smart dust” applications. The tradeoffs among security, memory, bandwidth, and tolerance for missing messages give rise to several new optimization problems. We report on experimental results and derive bounds on the performance of the scheme.
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Collins, M.J., Mitchell, S. (2008). Distance-Avoiding Sequences for Extremely Low-Bandwidth Authentication. In: Golomb, S.W., Parker, M.G., Pott, A., Winterhof, A. (eds) Sequences and Their Applications - SETA 2008. SETA 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5203. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85912-3_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85912-3_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85911-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85912-3
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