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Digital Signatures Out of Second-Preimage Resistant Hash Functions

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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5299))

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Abstract

We propose a new construction for Merkle authentication trees which does not require collision resistant hash functions; in contrast with previous constructions that attempted to avoid the dependency on collision resistance, our technique enjoys provable security assuming the well-understood notion of second-preimage resistance. The resulting signature scheme is existentially unforgeable when the underlying hash function is second-preimage resistant, yields shorter signatures, and is affected neither by birthday attacks nor by the recent progresses in collision-finding algorithms.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

    Erik Dahmen

  2. Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory, Japan

    Katsuyuki Okeya & Camille Vuillaume

  3. Future University, Hakodate, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

Authors
  1. Erik Dahmen
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  2. Katsuyuki Okeya
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  3. Tsuyoshi Takagi
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  4. Camille Vuillaume
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Hochschulstraße 10, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Johannes Buchmann

  2. University of Cincinnati, USA

    Jintai Ding

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Dahmen, E., Okeya, K., Takagi, T., Vuillaume, C. (2008). Digital Signatures Out of Second-Preimage Resistant Hash Functions. In: Buchmann, J., Ding, J. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5299. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88402-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88403-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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