Abstract
The agent’s private information contributes greatly to the principal’s decision in the supply chain coordination. Therefore, it is the important issue for the principal to design an effective incentive mechanism in order to get the true information from the agent. Assuming that the demand is dependent upon the agent’s effort level and the fuzzy market condition, this paper researches and analyses the principle-agent problem under fuzzy information asymmetry condition using the theory of principal-agent and incentive mechanism.
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Xu, X. (2009). On Coordination of Supply Chain Based on Information Asymmetry of Effort Level and Fuzzy Market Environment. In: Cao, By., Zhang, Cy., Li, Tf. (eds) Fuzzy Information and Engineering. Advances in Soft Computing, vol 54. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88914-4_69
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88914-4_69
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88913-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88914-4
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