Abstract
The CORAS method for security risk analysis provides a customized language, the CORAS diagrams, for threat and risk modelling. In this paper, we extend this language to capture context dependencies, and use it as a means to analyse mutual dependency. We refer to the extension as dependent CORAS diagrams. We define a textual syntax using EBNF and explain how a dependent CORAS diagram may be schematically translated via the textual syntax into a paragraph in English, characterizing its intended meaning. Then we demonstrate the suitability of the language by means of a core example.
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Brændeland, G., Dahl, H.E.I., Engan, I., Stølen, K. (2008). Using Dependent CORAS Diagrams to Analyse Mutual Dependency. In: Lopez, J., Hämmerli, B.M. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5141. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89173-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89173-4_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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