Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

International Conference on Logic for Programming Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning

LPAR 2008: Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning pp 353–376Cite as

A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5330))

Abstract

Game-based cryptographic proofs are typically expressed using pseudocode, which lacks a formal semantics. This can lead to ambiguous specifications, hidden mistakes, and even wrong proofs. We propose a language for expressing proofs that is expressive enough to specify all constructs occurring in cryptographic games, including probabilistic behaviors, the usage of oracles, and polynomial-time programs. The language is a probabilistic higher-order lambda calculus with recursive types, references, and support for events, and is simple enough that researchers without a strong background in the theory of programming languages can understand it. The language has been implemented in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abadi, M., Gordon, A.D.: A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. Information and Computation 148(1), 1–70 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography: The computational soundness of formal encryption. In: Watanabe, O., Hagiya, M., Ito, T., van Leeuwen, J., Mosses, P.D. (eds.) TCS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1872, pp. 3–22. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: Symmetric encryption in a simulatable Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library. In: Proc. 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pp. 204–218 (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A composable cryptographic library with nested operations (extended abstract). In: Proc. 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 220–230 (2003); Full version in IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2003/015 (January 2003), http://eprint.iacr.org/

  5. Barthe, G., Gregoire, B., Janvier, R., Zanella Beguelin, S.: Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs. IACR ePrint Archive (August. 2007), http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/314

  6. Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. International Journal of Information Security (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based game-playing proofs. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004, pp. 409–426. Springer, Heidelberg (2006), http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331.ps

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Blanchet, B.: A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. In: Proc. 27th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pp. 140–154 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Blanchet, B., Pointcheval, D.: Automated security proofs with sequences of games. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 537–554. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Canetti, R., Herzog, J.: Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key exchange protocols. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 380–403. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Corin, R., den Hartog, J.: A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic proofs. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4052, pp. 252–263. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Cortier, V., Warinschi, B.: Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 157–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. de Bruijn, N.G.: Lambda Calculus notation with nameless dummies: a tool for automatic formula manipulation. Indagationes Mathematicæ 34, 381–392 (1972)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography, May 2004. Basic Applications, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (May 2004), http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/frag.html

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Halevi, S.: A plausible approach to computer-aided cryptographic proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/181 (2005), http://eprint.iacr.org/

  16. Halmos, P.R.: Measure Theory. Graduate Texts in Mathematics, vol. 18. Springer, Heidelberg (1974)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Kemmerer, R.: Analyzing encryption protocols using formal verification techniques. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 7(4), 448–457 (1989)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Laud, P.: Semantics and program analysis of computationally secure information flow. In: Sands, D. (ed.) ESOP 2001. LNCS, vol. 2028, pp. 77–91. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Laud, P.: Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In: Proc. 25th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pp. 71–85 (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Levy, P.B.: Possible world semantics for general storage in call-by-value. In: Bradfield, J.C. (ed.) CSL 2002 and EACSL 2002. LNCS, vol. 2471, pp. 232–246. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Lowe, G.: Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In: TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Mason, I., Talcott, C.: Equivalence in Functional Languages with Effects. Journal of Functional Programming 1(3), 287–327 (1991)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  23. Meadows, C.: Using narrowing in the analysis of key management protocols. In: Proc. 10th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pp. 138–147 (1989)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 133–151. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Millen, J.K.: The interrogator: A tool for cryptographic protocol security. In: Proc. 5th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pp. 134–141 (1984)

    Google Scholar 

  26. Müller, O., Nipkow, T., von Oheimb, D., Slotosch, O.: HOLCF = HOL + LCF. Journal of Functional Programming 9(2), 191–223 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  27. Nipkow, T., Paulson, L.C., Wenzel, M.: Isabelle/HOL. LNCS, vol. 2283. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  28. Nowak, D.: A framework for game-based security proofs. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2007/199 (2007), http://eprint.iacr.org/

  29. Paulson, L.: The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryptology 6(1), 85–128 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Pierce, B.C.: Types and programming languages. MIT Press, Cambridge (2002)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  31. Schwinghammer, J.: Reasoning about Denotations of Recursive Objects. PhD thesis, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (July 2006)

    Google Scholar 

  32. Shoup, V.: Sequences of games: A tool for taming complexity in security proofs. IACR ePrint Archive (November 2004), http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/332.ps

  33. Thayer Fabrega, F.J., Herzog, J.C., Guttman, J.D.: Strand spaces: Why is a security protocol correct? In: Proc. 19th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pp. 160–171 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  34. The Coq development team. The Coq Proof Assistant Reference Manual (2006), http://coq.inria.fr

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Michael Backes, Matthias Berg & Dominique Unruh

  2. MPI-SWS, Germany

    Michael Backes

Authors
  1. Michael Backes
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Matthias Berg
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Dominique Unruh
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Carnegie Mellon University, Doha, Qatar

    Iliano Cervesato

  2. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

    Helmut Veith

  3. University of Manchester, UK

    Andrei Voronkov

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Backes, M., Berg, M., Unruh, D. (2008). A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode. In: Cervesato, I., Veith, H., Voronkov, A. (eds) Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning. LPAR 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89439-1_26

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89439-1_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89438-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89439-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation