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An Open Framework for Remote Electronic Elections

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5339))

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Abstract

We propose a framework for remote electronic elections with an independent, trustworthy authorization proxy. Unlike existing voting systems, voter authorization is separated from particular elections in our scheme, and is done through reusable credentials granted by the proxy. Moreover, different types of elections can fit in the framework, with different sets of legitimate voters and even different designs of voting and tabulation. We also define a cryptographic protocol for the credential generation and the election registration.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau SAR China, Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China

    Yu Zhang

Authors
  1. Yu Zhang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, USA

    Matthew K. Franklin

  2. Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China

    Lucas Chi Kwong Hui

  3. Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    Duncan S. Wong

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Zhang, Y. (2008). An Open Framework for Remote Electronic Elections. In: Franklin, M.K., Hui, L.C.K., Wong, D.S. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5339. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89641-8_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89641-8_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89640-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89641-8

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