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Protection of Sensitive Security Parameters in Integrated Circuits

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Mathematical Methods in Computer Science

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5393))

Abstract

To protect sensitive security parameters in the non-volatile memory of integrated circuits, a device is designed that generates a special secret key (called IC-Eigenkey) to symmetrically encrypt this data. The IC-Eigenkey is generated by the integrated circuit itself and therefore unknown to anybody else. The desired properties of such an IC-Eigenkey are postulated and a theoretical limit on the distribution of IC-Eigenkeys over an IC-production series is derived. The design of the IC-Eigenkey generator is based on silicon physical uncloneable functions. It exploits the marginal random variations of the propagation delays of gates and wires in an integrated circuit. A method is introduced that uses codewords of error control codes to configure the IC-Eigenkey generator in a way that the generated bits are as statistically independent of each other as possible.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Micronas GmbH, Hans-Bunte-Str. 19, D-79108, Freiburg, Germany

    Dejan E. Lazich

  2. Institut fuer Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme (IAKS), University of Karlsruhe, Am Fasanengarten 5, D-76131, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Micaela Wuensche

Authors
  1. Dejan E. Lazich
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  2. Micaela Wuensche
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme, Universität Karlsruhe, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Jacques Calmet  & Jörn Müller-Quade  & 

  2. Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme, Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Universität Karlsruhe, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Willi Geiselmann

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Lazich, D.E., Wuensche, M. (2008). Protection of Sensitive Security Parameters in Integrated Circuits. In: Calmet, J., Geiselmann, W., Müller-Quade, J. (eds) Mathematical Methods in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5393. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89994-5_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89994-5_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89993-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89994-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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