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Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

Given a network in which the edge capacities and the commodities are owned by the players, a cooperative multicommodity flow (MCF) game (N,v) can be defined such that v(S), the value of a sub-coalition S, is the maximum profit achievable within S by shipping its commodities through the sub-network owned by its members. In this paper, we study MCF games under a partially decentralized setting where the players make their own routing and resource exchange decisions given a set of capacity prices determined by a central authority.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and System Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA

    Luyi Gui & Özlem Ergun

Authors
  1. Luyi Gui
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  2. Özlem Ergun
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gui, L., Ergun, Ö. (2008). Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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