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Network Formation and Routing by Strategic Agents Using Local Contracts

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

In the Internet, Autonomous Systems (ASes) make contracts called Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between each other to transit one another’s traffic. ASes also try to control the routing of traffic to and from their networks in order to achieve efficient use of their infrastructure and to attempt to meet some level of quality of service globally. We introduce a game theoretic model in order to gain understanding of this interplay between network formation and routing. Player strategies allow them to make contracts with one another to forward traffic, and to re-route traffic that is currently routed through them. This model extends earlier work of [3] that only considered the network formation aspect of the problem. We study the structure and quality of Nash equilibria and quantify the prices of anarchy and stability, that is, the relative quality of a centralized optimal solution versus that of the Nash equilibria.

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Anshelevich, E., Wilfong, G. (2008). Network Formation and Routing by Strategic Agents Using Local Contracts. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_44

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

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