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Bin Packing of Selfish Items

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

We study a bin packing game in which any item to be packed is handled by a selfish agent. Each agent aims at minimizing his sharing cost with the other items staying in the same bin, where the social cost is the number of bins used. We first show that computing a pure Nash equilibrium can be done in polynomial time. We then prove that the price of anarchy for the game is in between 1.6416 and 1.6575, improving the previous bounds.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 310027, China

    Guosong Yu & Guochuan Zhang

  2. Department of Mathematics, Nanchang University, Nanchang, 330031, China

    Guosong Yu

  3. College of Computer Science, Zhejiang University, China

    Guochuan Zhang

Authors
  1. Guosong Yu
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  2. Guochuan Zhang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Yu, G., Zhang, G. (2008). Bin Packing of Selfish Items. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_50

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_50

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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