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Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

We study a problem in a network. The input is an edge-weighted graph G = (V,E) such that V contains a specific source node r. Every v ∈ V ∖ {r} is an entity which wants to be connected to r either directly or via other entities. The main question is how do the entities deviate from a socially optimal network if they are not monitored by a central authority. We provide theoretical bounds on the (strong) price of anarchy of this game. In particular, three variants – each of them being motivated by a practical situation – are studied.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS, UMR 7024, F-75775, Paris, France

    Laurent Gourvès & Jérôme Monnot

  2. Université de Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE, F-75775, Paris, France

    Laurent Gourvès & Jérôme Monnot

Authors
  1. Laurent Gourvès
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  2. Jérôme Monnot
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gourvès, L., Monnot, J. (2008). Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_52

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_52

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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