Abstract
We study a problem in a network. The input is an edge-weighted graph G = (V,E) such that V contains a specific source node r. Every v ∈ V ∖ {r} is an entity which wants to be connected to r either directly or via other entities. The main question is how do the entities deviate from a socially optimal network if they are not monitored by a central authority. We provide theoretical bounds on the (strong) price of anarchy of this game. In particular, three variants – each of them being motivated by a practical situation – are studied.
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Gourvès, L., Monnot, J. (2008). Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_52
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_52
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4
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