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Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

Recently, [8] defined the class of Linear Nash Bargaining Games (LNB) and obtained combinatorial, polynomial time algorithms for several games in this class. [8] also defines two natural subclasses within LNB, UNB and SNB, which contain a number of natural Nash bargaining games. In this paper we define three basic game theoretic properties of Nash bargaining games: price of bargaining, fairness and full competitiveness. We show that for each of these properties, a game in UNB has this property iff it is in SNB.

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References

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chakrabarty, D., Goel, G., Vazirani, V.V., Wang, L., Yu, C. (2008). Efficiency, Fairness and Competitiveness in Nash Bargaining Games. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_55

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_55

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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