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Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

The recent result of Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [9] gives a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem regarding manipulation in elections, but holds only for neutral social choice functions and three alternatives. We complement their theorem by proving a similar result regarding Pareto-Optimal social choice functions when the number of voters is two. We discuss the implications of our results with respect to the agenda of precluding manipulation in elections by means of computational hardness.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, 91904, Israel

    Shahar Dobzinski

  2. Microsoft Israel R&D Center, 13 Shenkar Street, Herzeliya, 46725, Israel

    Ariel D. Procaccia

Authors
  1. Shahar Dobzinski
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  2. Ariel D. Procaccia
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dobzinski, S., Procaccia, A.D. (2008). Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_71

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_71

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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