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A Reputation-Based Game for Tasks Allocation

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Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 24))

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Abstract

We present in this paper a distributed game theoretical model for tasks allocation. During the game, each agent submits a cost for achieving a specific task. Each agent, that is offering a specific task, computes the so-called reputation-based cost, which is the product between the submitted cost and the inverse of the reputation value of the bidding agent. The game winner is the agent which has the minimal reputation-based cost. We show how the use of reputation allows a better allocation of tasks with respect to a conventional allocation where there is no consideration of the reputation as a criteria for allocating tasks.

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Yahyaoui, H. (2009). A Reputation-Based Game for Tasks Allocation. In: Filipe, J., Cordeiro, J. (eds) Enterprise Information Systems. ICEIS 2009. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 24. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01347-8_60

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01347-8_60

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01346-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01347-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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