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Allocation Method of Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity Based on Uniform Price Auction

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Advances in Neural Networks – ISNN 2009 (ISNN 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5551))

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Abstract

To study the allocating problem of total permitted pollution discharge capacity(TPPDC), an allocation method with variable supply based on the uniform price auction of divisible goods is proposed in this paper firstly. Then, a linear equilibrium bidding strategy of this new method is given. Lastly, the incentive compatibility and validity of this method are proved. Therefore, this method will provide valuable theoretical basis and guidance for building the pollution emission permits trade system.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Rao, C., Zhang, Z., Liu, J. (2009). Allocation Method of Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity Based on Uniform Price Auction. In: Yu, W., He, H., Zhang, N. (eds) Advances in Neural Networks – ISNN 2009. ISNN 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5551. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01507-6_121

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01507-6_121

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01506-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01507-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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