Abstract
In 2007, LaMacchia et al. proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, which is currently regarded as the strongest security model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In the eCK model, the adversary can reveal a party’s ephemeral private key or static private key on the test session, but can’t reveal the ephemeral value which was computed using ephemeral private key and static private key. In this paper, we first present the modified eCK (meCK) model by adding a new reveal query. The adversary can reveal all ephemeral secret information of the test session according to the meCK model’s freshness definition. Then we propose a new strongly secure AKE protocol, called E-NAXOS, and prove its security in the meCK model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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Cheng, Q., Ma, C., Hu, X. (2009). A New Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol. In: Park, J.H., Chen, HH., Atiquzzaman, M., Lee, C., Kim, Th., Yeo, SS. (eds) Advances in Information Security and Assurance. ISA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02617-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02617-1_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02616-4
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