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Enhancing Bidding Strategies in CDAs by Adaptive Judgement of Price Acceptability

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Multi-Agent Systems for Society (PRIMA 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4078))

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Abstract

Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs) and agent technology provide great opportunities for market institutions to carry out real-world trading quickly and conveniently. There are several bidding strategies in the literature for agents in CDAs to employ, which achieve good performance. However, almost all of these strategies do not judge whether a price is acceptable before they calculate their own asks or bids. Experiment results have demonstrated that the judgement of price acceptability can enhance the performance of agents. In order to enable agents to adopt the judgement of price acceptability in dynamic CDA markets, we propose an adaptive mechanism. The core of the adaptive mechanism is eagerness, which enables agents to explore the realtime supply and demand relationship and adjust the thresholds of price acceptability accordingly. Experiment results show that agents adopting the adaptive mechanism remarkably outperform the agents without the mechanism.

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Ma, H., Leung, Hf. (2009). Enhancing Bidding Strategies in CDAs by Adaptive Judgement of Price Acceptability. In: Lukose, D., Shi, Z. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems for Society. PRIMA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4078. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03339-1_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03339-1_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03337-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03339-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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