Abstract
Electronic voting technologies have been quite widely deployed in a number of democracies. In the US for example, approximately 30% of the electorate used Direct Recorded Electronic (DRE) machines in the 2004 and 2008 presidential election. These systems have come in for significant criticism leading many experts to conclude that all digital technology used in voting must be flawed. While these critiques are fully justified and documented, to conclude that all voting technology must be irredeemably flawed is not in our view justified. The purpose of this note is to argue that, while it is undoubtedly true that careless introduction of information technology can undermine democracy, high assurance, verifiable voting schemes do exist and are worthy of serious consideration. Furthermore, such verifiable schemes can provide higher levels of trustworthiness than traditional pencil and paper, hand counting systems. The challenge remains to convince the various stakeholders of the trustworthiness of such schemes.
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Ryan, P.Y.A. (2009). How Many Election Officials Does It Take to Change an Election?. In: Degano, P., Viganò, L. (eds) Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis. ARSPA-WITS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5511. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_14
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