Abstract
Formal validation of security protocols is of utmost importance before they gain market or academic acceptance. In particular, the results obtained from the formal validation of the improved Optimistic Fair Exchange Protocol based on Signature Policies (OFEPSP+) are presented. OFEPSP+ ensures that no party gains an unfair advantage over the other during the protocol execution, while substantially reducing the probability of a successful attack on the protocol due to a compromise of the signature creation environment. We have used the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) and the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA (SPAN), two powerful automated reasoning technique tools to formally specify and validate security protocols for the Internet.
The authors would like to thank the AVISPA project team, and specially Laurent Vigneron and Luca Viganò, for their useful comments on the preliminary versions of OFEPSP+ HLPSL specification. The authors wish also to thank the reviewers for their valuable remarks.
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Hernandez-Ardieta, J.L., Gonzalez-Tablas, A.I., Ramos, B. (2009). Formal Validation of OFEPSP+ with AVISPA. In: Degano, P., Viganò, L. (eds) Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis. ARSPA-WITS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5511. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_9
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