Abstract
Economies of scale and scope describe key characteristics of production cost functions that influence allocations and prices on procurement markets. Auction designs for markets with economies of scale are much less well understood than combinatorial auctions, they require new bidding languages, and the supplier selection typically becomes a hard computational problem. We suggest a bidding language for respective markets, and conduct computational experiments to explore the incremental computational burden to determine optimal solutions brought about by the need to express economies of scope for problems of practical size.
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Davenport, A., Kalagnanam, J.: Price negotiations for procurement of direct inputs. In: Dietrich, B., Vohra, R. (eds.) Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction and Markets. IMA Volumes in Mathematics and its Applications. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
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© 2009 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Bichler, M., Schneider, S., Guler, K., Sayal, M. (2009). Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale. In: Das, S., Ostrovsky, M., Pennock, D., Szymanksi, B. (eds) Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. AMMA 2009. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 14. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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