Abstract
Interest in counterterrorism modelling has increased recently. A common theme in the approaches adopted is the need to develop methods to analyse decisions when there are intelligent opponents ready to increase our risks. Most of the approaches have a clear game theoretic flavour, although there have been some decision analytic based approaches. We have recently introduced a framework for adversarial risk analysis, aimed at dealing with problems with intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. In this paper, we shall explore how such framework may cope with two of the standard counterterrorism model formulations: sequential defend-attack and simultaneous defend-attack moves.
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Rios, J., Rios Insua, D. (2009). Adversarial Risk Analysis: Applications to Basic Counterterrorism Models. In: Rossi, F., Tsoukias, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5783. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_27
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