Abstract
We present an overview of the potential of relation algebra and the software tool RelView, based on it, to compute solutions for problems from social choice. Using one leading example throughout the text, we subsequently show how the RelView tool may be used to compute and visualize minimal winning coalitions, swingers of a given coalition, vulnerable winning coalitions, central players, dominant players, Banzhaf power indices of the different players, Hoede Bakker indices of the different players in a network, and finally stable coalitions/governments. Although problems from social choice and games are mostly exponential, due to the BDD implementation of RelView, computations are feasible for the examples which appear in practice.
Co-operation for this paper is supported by European Science Foundation EUROCORES Programme - LogICCC.
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de Swart, H., Berghammer, R., Rusinowska, A. (2009). Computational Social Choice Using Relation Algebra and RelView . In: Berghammer, R., Jaoua, A.M., Möller, B. (eds) Relations and Kleene Algebra in Computer Science. RelMiCS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5827. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04639-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04639-1_2
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