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Bayesian Versus Frequentist Statistical Reasoning

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International Encyclopedia of Statistical Science

We can consider the existence of two main statistical schools: Bayesian and frequentist. Both provide ways to deal with probability, although their methods and theories are mutually exclusive (Vallverdú 2008).

Bayesian Statistics

From a historical perspective, Bayesian appeared first, in 1763, when Richard Price published posthumously the paper of late Rev. Thomas Bayes “An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances” (Dale 2003). In this paper, Bayes presented his ideas about the best way of dealing with probability (and trying to solve the problem of inverse probability), which can be exemplified today with the classic formula called “Bayes’ Rule” or “Bayes’ Theorem”:

$$P\left (A\left \vert B\right .\right ) = \frac{P\left (B\left \vert A\right .\right )P\left (A\right )} {P\left (B\right )} .$$

We must look at the notation and terminology involved:

  • P(A | B) is the conditional probability of A, given B. It is also called the posterior probabilitybecause it is derived...

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References and Further Reading

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Vallverdú, J. (2011). Bayesian Versus Frequentist Statistical Reasoning. In: Lovric, M. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Statistical Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04898-2_2

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