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The Handicap Principle for Trust in Computer Security, the Semantic Web and Social Networking

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Web Information Systems and Mining (WISM 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5854))

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Abstract

Communication is a fundamental function of life, and it exists in almost all living things: from single-cell bacteria to human beings. Communication, together with competition and cooperation,arethree fundamental processes in nature. Computer scientists are familiar with the study of competition or ’struggle for life’ through Darwin’s evolutionary theory, or even evolutionary computing. They may be equally familiar with the study of cooperation or altruism through the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. However, they are likely to be less familiar with the theory of animal communication. The objective of this article is three-fold: (i) To suggest that the study of animal communication, especially the honesty (reliability) of animal communication, in which some significant advances in behavioral biology have been achieved in the last three decades, should be on the verge to spawn important cross-disciplinary research similar to that generated by the study of cooperation with the PD game. One of the far-reaching advances in the field is marked by the publication of "The Handicap Principle: a Missing Piece of Darwin’s Puzzle" by Zahavi (1997). The ’Handicap’ principle [34][35], which states that communication signals must be costly in some proper way to be reliable (honest), is best elucidated with evolutionary games, e.g., Sir Philip Sidney (SPS) game [23]. Accordingly, we suggest that the Handicap principle may serve as a fundamental paradigm for trust research in computer science. (ii) To suggest to computer scientists that their expertise in modeling computer networks may help behavioral biologists in their study of the reliability of animal communication networks. This is largely due to the historical reason that, until the last decade, animal communication was studied with the dyadic paradigm (sender-receiver) rather than with the network paradigm. (iii) To pose several open questions, the answers to which may bear some refreshing insights to trust research in computer science, especially secure and resilient computing, the semantic web, and social networking. One important thread unifying the three aspects is the evolutionary game theory modeling or its extensions with survival analysis and agreement algorithms [19][20], which offer powerful game models for describing time-, space-, and covariate-dependent frailty (uncertainty and vulnerability) and deception (honesty).

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Ma, Z.(., Krings, A.W., Hung, CC. (2009). The Handicap Principle for Trust in Computer Security, the Semantic Web and Social Networking. In: Liu, W., Luo, X., Wang, F.L., Lei, J. (eds) Web Information Systems and Mining. WISM 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5854. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05250-7_48

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05250-7_48

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-05249-1

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