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On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5929))

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Abstract

We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in weighted congestion games with polynomial delay functions. In [1] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of players n even for unweighted players and linear delay functions. Nevertheless, extending the work of [11], we show that Θ(n loglog W) (where W is the sum of all the players’ weights) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that every O(n) steps each player performs a constant (and non-null) number of best responses.

This research was partially supported by the grant NRF-RF2009-08 “Algorithmic aspects of coalitional games”.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, Germany

    Angelo Fanelli

  2. Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    Angelo Fanelli

  3. Department of Science, University of Chieti-Pescara, Italy

    Luca Moscardelli

Authors
  1. Angelo Fanelli
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  2. Luca Moscardelli
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information and Systems, Sapienza University of Rome, Via Ariosto 25, 00185, Roma, Italy

    Stefano Leonardi

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Fanelli, A., Moscardelli, L. (2009). On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays. In: Leonardi, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5929. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10840-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10841-9

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